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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

27 April 1979

ALERT MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Security Council

SUBJECT : Possible Movement of Cuban Forces into
Southern Africa

There has been an accumulation of reports and rumors recently which suggests that some number of Cuban forces, or possibly a significant increment of advisory personnel, are about to be introduced into Frontline States contending with Rhodesia. The intelligence is by no means conclusive, but I believe that the situation bears especially close watching at this time, and I am making you aware of my concern.

[Redacted Signature]

tu STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

[Redacted Attachment]

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

27 April 1979

ALERT MEMORANDUM*

POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF CUBAN FORCES INTO FRONTLINE STATES
(ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, TANZANIA)

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Fragmentary evidence suggests that a significant movement of Cuban forces into southern Africa may be about to occur with Soviet support. Since about 17 April, when the Frontline Defense Ministers (Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania) met in Dar es Salaam, there have been reports and rumors that the Frontline States were about to call for "outside help" to assist them in defending their territories, and the Zimbabwe guerrilla bases there, against Rhodesian attacks.

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This "evidence" is in no way conclusive, but the logic of the situation in southern Africa--the effectiveness of Rhodesian raids, ZAPU's disarray, the heavy punishment of Zambia and Mozambique, the increased South African support of Rhodesia, and the Rhodesian elections--is such that it cannot be dismissed.

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The arrival of Cuban military units, as distinct from some increment of advisory personnel or air defense specialists, for example, would be a new development in any of the Frontline States

**The Alert Memorandum is an interagency publication issued by the Director of Central Intelligence on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Its purpose is to ensure that senior policymakers are aware of the serious implications for US interests of impending potential developments. It is not a prediction that these developments will occur. This memorandum has been coordinated at the working level by CIA, DIA, NSA, and State/INR.*

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except Angola, and would mark a very sharp shift in policy by the leaders of Zambia and Tanzania, in particular. DIA believes that Mozambique would be a more likely candidate than either of these states for a sizable movement of Cubans. [REDACTED]

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Such a development would obviously sharpen the "cold war" aspects of the Rhodesian situation. It would also serve to justify, in their own eyes at least, the South Africans' conviction that whites and moderate blacks in southern Africa face a communist offensive and could result in even more open and more direct South African support for the Muzorewa/Smith regime. [REDACTED]

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Moreover, a new Cuban move at this time clearly would have, or be seen to have, implications for a wide range of relationships between the United States, the USSR, and Cuba, as well as between the United States and African states. It would also impact on British and other West European opinion and attitudes toward southern African problems and toward US policies there. [REDACTED]

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